Should public policy be colour blind? Or must governments and public institutions
take account of people’s race, ethnicity, culture and faith in formulating
policy?
This debate is often seen as a clash of ideologies between the French republican
tradition and Anglo-American pragmatism, between assimilationists and multiculturalists.
Assimilationists argue that equality requires that every individual be treated
as a citizen, not as a member of a particular racial or cultural group. We
should be wary not only of introducing suspect categories into public policy
but also of institutionalising discord and division. Used as a criterion for
allocating resources or opportunities, such critics argue, racial categorisation
inevitably confers advantages on members of some groups and disadvantages
on members of others and hence helps perpetuate social antagonisms.
The idea of a neutral public space and of colour-blind public policies, multiculturalists
retort, is a myth. Racial discrimination is a fact and without taking into
account the reality of racial and cultural differences it is possible neither
to measure the degree of discrimination that people face nor to combat it.
Moreover, they argue, policy must respond to people's real needs, and one
of the most important needs is to sustain an identity and a culture, and for
these to receive public recognition.
One of the ironies of this debate is that the quarrel between assimilationists
and multiculturalists has become particularly acute in recent years less because
both sides are confident of their arguments than because both have developed
deep misgivings. Both appear perplexed by the problem of how to manage a diverse
society while maintaining a sense of common identity.
Both the debate, and the misgivings, were brought into sharp focus in the
autumn of 2005, when France and Britain were almost simultaneously rocked
by riots. From Paris to Marseilles French cities were set ablaze in two weeks
of violent mayhem, largely at hands of North African youth living in the banlieus.
In Britain a weekend of rioting between African Caribbeans and Asians in the
Lozells area of Birmingham culminated in the murder of a young black man at
the hands of an Asian gang.
In Britain, the impact of the riots was to confirm the sense that something
had gone wrong with multiculturalism. Yet, paradoxically, it was also to reinforce
the sense that there was no alternative to multiculturalism. France, many
suggested, had reached the point Britain was at in the late seventies when
inner city riots forced its policy makers to take racism seriously and to
adopt a multiculturalist approach. Britain is in no position to lecture, Jonathan
Freedland wrote in the Guardian but the French model of colour-blind
integration gives racism a free hand. France cannot face up to its racism
because it 'does not officially recognise the concept of ethnic differences'.
Whatever the problems of multiculturalism, ran the argument, at least Britain
has faced up to the problem of racism and is attempting to deal with it, even
if in a cackhanded fashion.
It seems common sense that without acknowledging racial and cultural differences
it will be possible neither to monitor discrimination nor to combat it. But
is introducing ethnic classification into public policy the best way to combat
racism? And does the collection of ethnic data really help the struggle against
discrimination?
The criminologist Marian Fitzgerald worked as a researcher in the Home Office
in the 1980s. When she first arrived there, she was astonished at the paucity
of data on racial and ethnic differences within the criminal justice system.
The only figures routinely collected were on prisoners, and then in a desultory
fashion. Americans, on the other hand, 'not only had a range of data on ethnic
minorities and the criminal justice system that was way beyond anything that
I could imagine the Home Office collecting, they'd also been collecting it
for decades'. But to what avail?, Fitzgerald asked herself. Despite the surfeit
of data the position of poor blacks in America had deteriorated, not improved,
over time.
Of course, however much information we may collect about discrimination, it
is meaningless without the political will to enforce change - something that
has often been missing in America. There is, however, another problem too:
the very nature of ethnic classification produces data that often hinders
rather than helps the struggle for equality. Social differences that are politically
salient are not necessarily the ones that are meaningful in assessing the
causes of discrimination or helpful in combating it.
There are clearly wide disparities between racial and cultural groups when
it comes to issues such as employment prospects, educational attainments,
poverty levels and treatment at the hands of the police and the criminal justice
system. What causes such disproportionalities? The default multiculturalist
assumption is that they must be the product of racism. Indeed, any attempt
to view such disproportionalities in terms other racism is itself often dismissed
as racist. As the MacPherson report into the Stephen Lawrence murder put it
in discussing stop and search figures, 'Nobody in the minority ethnic communities
believes that the complex arguments which are sometimes used to explain the
figures... are valid'. Since 'attempts to justify the disparities through
the identification of other factors... simply exacerbates the climate of distrust'
so we must accept that any disproportionality must be the result of either
direct or indirect racism.
This belief that any kind of racial or ethnic disproportionality is de facto
evidence of racism is deeply rooted in our political culture. Although British
political leaders have largely shied away from imposing quotas and affirmative
action policies, they have encouraged the idea that combating racism entails
ensuring the right percentage of minorities in every aspect of social life.
Two assumptions underlie the disproportionality principle: first, that race,
ethnicity and culture (and these are often seen as interchangeable) are the
most important labels we can place on people; and second that there is a causal
relationship between membership of such a group and disproportionalities between
groups. Neither assumption is valid. Minority groups are not homogenous entities
but are as divided by issues of class, gender, age, geographical location,
and so on, as the rest of the population. These factors often shape individuals'
lives far more than do race, ethnicity or culture.
Take, for instance, the problems faced by Bangladeshis in Britain. Bangladeshis
used to Asian. Now they are Muslim. What has not changed is the fact that
they do badly on most measures of social deprivation, educational attainment
or employment prospects. The dispoportionality principle suggests that their
problems used to stem from discrimination against Asians. Now it is the result
of discrimination against Muslims. There is an element of truth to both claims.
But both also miss the real problems facing Bangladeshi communities.
We can see this more clearly if we look at the debate about educational attainment
among Asians and African Caribbeans. We all know that Asians excel at school
and African Caribbeans, especially African Caribbean boys, do badly. Some,
CRE chief Trevor Phillips among them, are so worried that they want black
boys to be educated separately.
The trouble is that what we think know about race and education has little
bearing to reality. For in reality race has little to do with the differing
performance of blacks, whites and Asians. For a start, not all Asians perform
well at school. Pupils of Indian origin generally tend to do well, but the
performance of Bangladeshis and Pakistani is very similar to that of blacks,
particularly when we are talking about boys.
When Bangladeshis were Asians they were bracketed together with Indians, and
the differences between the two groups were largely ignored. Now that they
are Muslims, the poor performance of Bangladeshis has attracted attention,
but is put down to 'Islamophobia'. In fact, in discussions about education,
Bangladeshis really belong with African Caribbeans - and the cause of their
poor educational performance relates not to their race or their faith but
to their class.
At the age of seven the performance of African Caribbean boys is virtually
identical with the national average. However it falls dramatically in secondary
schools as it does for Pakistani and Bangladeshi boys. When Marian Fitzgerald
used eligibility for free school meals (FSM) as a surrogate measure for poverty,
she demonstrated an even more dramatic fall - at the age 14, the scores of
FSM boys are half of those of non-FSM boys. In other words class and poverty
seem more important determinants of poor educational performance than race.
Yet so obsessed are we by racial categories that the question remains 'Why
do black boys do so badly?' rather than 'Why do boys from poor background
of whatever race ethnicity or faith do so badly?'. Racism clearly shapes the
lives of many Bangladeshis and African Caribbeans but race (or culture or
faith) cannot be a one-stop explanation for all problems.
Fitzgerald, together with criminologist Chris Hale, has demonstrated a similar
problem with discussions of race and crime. Black people are over-represented
in robbery statistics (both as perpetrator and victim) leading to the widespread
belief that there is something about black culture (or even black nature)
that gives rise to criminality. Fitzgerald and Hale have shown that with careful
analysis of the data, race and ethnicity drops out of the picture entirely.
Street crime is much more likely in areas in which there is a high population
turnover and a combination of young people living in poverty alongside others
who are not just more affluent but also trendy enough to own gadgets like
mobile phones or iPods that are both valuable and possess street cred. It
just so happens that young blacks live disproportionately in such areas. But
where such areas contain large numbers of poor young whites, they too are
represented in the robbery figures.
The category 'lives in an area of high population turnover with a mixture
of poor people and affluent trendies' is not a politically salient group.
The category black is. So we tend to associate street robbery with blackness.
The result is what Fitzgerald calls 'statistical racism'. Because the relationship
between blacks and robberies seems statistically so fixed, so people start
believing that little can be done to change that relationship and there develops
notions of innate black criminality. Ethnic monitoring both makes us see racism
where none exists and creates new racial stereotypes.
The problem with ethnic classification is not just that the data may not be
useful. It is that the process of classification often creates the very problems
it is supposed to solve. Identities are not natural categories. They are created
through social interaction. But as multicultural categories receive official
sanction, so they become in a certain sense fixed and appear almost natural.
Once the distribution of political power, financial resources and social opportunities
become linked to one's membership of a particular group, so these group identities
acquire a reality denied to other identities.
To see this process in action, we need look no further than the Lozells riot.
The riots demonstrated how the process of politically recognising distinct
identities can give rise to communal conflict. The roots of the riots lie
20 years earlier in 1985 riots which took place down the road in Handsworth,
when blacks, whites and Asians took to the streets together in protest against
poverty, unemployment and, in particular, oppressive policing.
In response, Birmingham council proposed a new framework for the engagement
of minority communities. It created a number of community organisations, labelled
Umbrella Groups, the function of which was to represent the needs of their
communities. By 1993 there were nine of these, defined by ethnicity and faith
- the African and Caribbean People's Movement, the Bangladeshi Islamic Projects
Consultative Committee, the Birmingham Chinese Society, The Council of Black-led
Churches, the Hindu Council, the Irish Forum, the Vietnamese Association,
the Pakistani Forum and the Sikh Council of Gurdwaras. A Standing Consultative
Forum was established as a single body through which the Umbrella Groups could
collectively represent the views of minority communities and to aid policy
development and resource allocation.
Once political power and financial resources became allocated by ethnicity,
then people began to identify themselves in terms of those ethnicities. And
they began to identify others as also belonging to particular ethnic blocs.
The consequence was the creation of tensions between groups, as in the words
of one academic study of Birmingham, 'the different Umbrella Groups generally
attempted to maximise their own interests'. The deepest animosities were created
between African Caribbeans and Asians, each viewing the other as responsible
for their problems. Multicultural prescription had made real the description
to which it was supposedly a response.
Where does all this take us in the debate between multiculturalists and assimilationists?
Ignoring racism on the grounds that all citizens are equal and hence that
racial or cultural differences are immaterial is clearly unacceptable. But
so is labelling individuals by race, culture or faith and creating conflicts
by institutionalising such differences in public policy.
To get beyond the increasingly sterile debate between multiculturalism and
assimilationism, we need to make four kinds of distinctions. First we need
to separate the idea of diversity as lived experience from that of multiculturalism
as a political process. The experience of living in a society made diverse
by mass immigration is to be welcomed. The political project of institutionalising
such diversity through the public recognition of cultural differences should
be resisted. As lived experience, diversity is an argument for open borders
and open minds. The consequences of multiculturalism as a political project
is, however, to seal people into ethnic boxes and to police the boundaries.
At a time when the political failures of multicultualism are being increasingly
exploited as an argument for a Fortress Europe, we need to defend to defend
the idea of open borders both at national boundaries and between cultures.
Second, we need to distinguish between colour blindness and racism blindness.
The assimilationist resolve to treat everyone as citizens, not as bearers
of specific racial or cultural histories, is an important step in the fight
against racism. But the insistence that individuals should not be treated
differently because of their racial and cultural identities does not mean
that discrimination against particular groups should be ignored. The French
policy of corralling hunadreds or thousands of the poor and disadvantaged
into sink estates, exposing them to unemployment rates of up to 40 per cent
and subjecting them to daily discrimination at the hands of employers and
the police is not designed to produce liberté, egalité et fraternité.
Citizenship has no meaning if different classes of citizens are treated differently,
whether through multicultural policies or through racism.
Third, we need to distinguish between equal treatment of individuals and equal
treatment of the groups to which they may belong. Policy based on the idea
that racial and cultural groups should necessarily be proportionately represented
tends both to ignore the real roots of inequality and to create inequality
and conflict. We should reject too the idea that the beliefs and values of
different groups should be protected or accorded respect.
Finally, we need to separate our attitudes to the public and the private spheres.
The private sphere is inherently unequal. Political equality only becomes
possible with the creation of a ring-fenced public sphere, which everyone
can enter as political equals, whatever their cultural, economic or ethnic
backgrounds. Both multiculturalists and assimilationists seek to erase the
distinction, on the one hand by demanding public recognition of cultural differences,
on the other by insisting that the state step in to impose cultural norms
on immigrants - such as, for instance, banning the wearing of the veil. In
so doing, they make equality impossible. Only by establishing a distinction
between the public and the private can we forge a relationship between diversity
and equality, allowing citizens to have full freedom to pursue their different
values or practices in private, while ensuring that in the public sphere all
citizens are treated as political equals whatever the differences in their
private lives.