The psychologist Geoff Miller has called it a 'paradigm shift': the restoration
of human nature into discussions of human behaviour, political policy and
social organisation. Where once the idea of human nature was treated with
suspicion and ridicule, today there is barely a human activity for which someone
does not have an evolutionary account.
A key figure in bringing about this change in the intellectual climate has
been the psychologist Steven Pinker. Books such as The Language Instinct
and How the Mind Works have established Pinker's reputation both as
one of the finest science writers of his generation and as a swashbuckling
champion of evolutionary psychology and the computational theory of mind.
Pinker, however, remains unconvinced that there has been an intellectual transformation.
Human nature, he insists, remains 'a modern taboo'. It's a taboo 'that distorts
our science and scholarship, our public discourse and our day-to-day lives.'
In his new book, The Blank Slate, Pinker seeks to restore balance to
the discussion of what it is to be human.
The 'modern denial of human nature', he argues, is rooted in three beliefs
- the Blank Slate, the Noble Savage and the Ghost in the Machine. According
to the Blank Slate view, human infants are born with empty heads and acquire
all their knowledge socially. The ideology of the Noble Savage suggests that
humans are naturally born good, and that society corrupts their innate goodness.
The Ghost in the Machine is the term that the philosopher Gilbert Ryle gave
(with 'deliberate abusiveness', he said) to Descartes' view of the mind as
an immaterial spirit distinct from the physical world.
Many social scientists cling to these three beliefs - what philosophers would
call empiricism, romanticism and dualism - because, Pinker suggests, they
are gripped by a politically-inspired dread of human nature. The Blank Slate
unpicks the main political and moral fears, in particular the worry that scientific
theories of human nature might legitimise inequality, undermine moral responsibility,
and lead to nihilism by robbing human life of any meaning. Not only are 'claims
about human nature less dangerous than many people think', Pinker argues,
but 'the denial of human nature can be more dangerous than people think.'
There is much to admire about The Blank Slate, not least the wit and
panache with which it is written. I agree with much of the criticism of the
blank slate view (though it is worth asking who it is that still believes
in it) and with Pinker’s dismissal of most of the political and moral
fears about the concept of human nature.
The Blank Slate, however, is more than simply an argument about the
importance of human nature. For Pinker, the blank slate view is not so much
an incorrect vision of human behaviour as a general-purpose bogeyman responsible
for every bad idea in the twentieth century - or, at least, every one that
Pinker dislikes. Among the horrors laid at its door are totalitarianism, relativism,
progressive education, modernist art, postmodernist literature, atonal music,
bad public housing, liberal criminology, unacceptable child rearing practices
and hostility to biotechnology. The ideology of the Noble Savage, in the meantime,
'invites contempt for the principles of democracy' and, most bizarrely, is
held responsible for the rise of celebrity culture. The only things that seem
to be missing from the list are Islamic fundamentalism and the events of September
11.
Pinker wants, not just to demolish the bad ideas to which he believes we still
cling, but also to lay the foundations for a new vision of what it is to be
human, to provide a 'scientific explanation for the tragedy of the human condition'.
Recent advances in genetics, neuroscience, evolutionary psychology and artificial
intelligence have certainly transformed the way we think about human nature,
illuminating a variety of human behaviours from autism to sexual desire. Humans,
however, are not simply natural beings and cannot be understood as if we were.
Human history is as much about our emancipation from nature as about our embodiment
in it.
The difficulty in understanding humans in a purely naturalistic way can be
seen in Pinker's own argument. The key to a science of human nature, Pinker
argues, is the distinction between biological facts and human values. Human
values are not rooted in nature, but arise in spite of nature. Pinker rejects
both the 'naturalistic fallacy' (the belief that if something is natural,
it must be good) and the 'moralistic fallacy' - the claim that if a trait
is moral, it must be found in nature. This separation of nature and values
allows Pinker to make mincemeat of the traditional criticism that evolutionary
psychology provides an excuse for bad behaviour or reactionary practices.
There is a difference, he points out, between explanation and exculpation.
To explain a phenomenon is not to accept it as morally good. Men may be naturally
promiscuous, but that does not necessarily make promiscuity right, nor does
it necessarily excuse the behaviour of promiscuous men. 'Nature is what we
are put on this earth to rise above', Pinker suggests, echoing Katharine Hepburn
in The African Queen.
But this separation of nature and values raises new problems. Human values,
presumably, do not float down from the sky, but emerge out of human thought
and behaviour. How then do they originate if not through 'natural selection
and neurophysiology' which Pinker considers the basis of all human thought
and behaviour?
This very question, Pinker retorts, 'is itself a symptom of the Blank Slate'.
Values to not enter our heads from the outside, but emerge organically from
brain processes. Since the 'mind is a system of many parts', so 'an innate
desire is just one component among others'. Some innate faculties 'may endow
us with greed or lust or malice, but others may endow us with sympathy, foresight,
self-respect, a desire for respect from others, and an ability to learn from
our own experiences and those of our neighbours.'
Nature, in other words, has endowed us with both good and bad propensities,
and particular values arise from the clash of these differing tendencies.
This suggests that, contrary to Pinker's previous argument, values are biological
processes and are rooted in nature. It is difficult to distinguish this argument
from that which Pinker condemns as the 'moralistic fallacy'. The primatologist
Frans de Waal - whom no one could accuse of being an advocate of the blank
slate view - suggests acidly in his book The Ape and the Sushi Master
that thinkers like Pinker 'want to have it both ways: human behaviour is an
evolutionary product except when it is hard to explain'. What is lacking in
such arguments, de Waal points out, 'is an indication of how we can possibly
negate our genes'.
No one - not even the blankest of blank slate advocates - denies that human
thoughts and behaviours are the products of brain processes, nor that our
propensity to be moral beings may be an evolved trait. But this is not the
same as explaining where those thoughts and values come from in the first
place. Why, for instance, have we come to believe that slavery is wrong and
the idea of equal worth good? Pinker suggests that everyone feels 'revulsion...
toward discrimination and slavery', because it is in human nature to reject
such treatment: 'No one likes being enslaved. No one likes being humiliated.'
For most of human history, though, slavery was regarded as natural as individual
freedom is today. Only in the past two hundred years have we begun to view
the practice with revulsion. Why? Partly because of the political ideas generated
by the Enlightenment, partly because of the changing economic needs of capitalism,
and partly because of the social struggles of the enslaved and the oppressed.
To understand human values such as the belief in equal worth we need to explore
not so much human psychology as human history, society and politics.
Another way of putting this is that human nature is not simply natural. We
often lose sight of this because of the ambiguity of the concept of human
nature. On the one hand, human nature means that which expresses the essence
of being human, what Darwinists call 'species-typical' behaviour. On the other,
it means that which is constituted by nature; in Darwinian terms that which
is the product of natural selection. In non-human animals the two meanings
are synonymous. What dogs, bats or sharks typically do as a species, they
do because of natural selection. But this is not true of humans. The human
essence - what we consider to be the common properties of our humanity - is
shaped as much by our history as by our biology.
A good illustration of the historicity of the human essence is, paradoxically,
the universality of great art. Art, Pinker argues, is 'in our genes', because
nature endows us with an innate aesthetic sense. Great artists, such as Shakespeare
or Beethoven, are appreciated across cultures and over time because their
work taps into the universal features of human nature. Modernism, on the other
hand, has been an aesthetic failure, Pinker suggests, because it developed
'out of a militant denial of human nature'.
Not only is this a crass view of modernism but also a misunderstanding of
Shakespeare's genius. Shakespeare did not simply articulate universal themes
of love, lust and power; he also helped fashion a new vision of what it is
to be human. Shakespeare's characters speak to us in an entirely different
way because, unlike previous literary figures, they possess a self-consciousness
as we do. As the American critic Harold Bloom puts it, 'Insofar as we ourselves
value, and deplore, our own personalities, we are the heirs of Falstaff and
Hamlet, and of all the persons who throng Shakespeare's theater of what might
be called the colors of the spirit.'
Shakespeare was not alone in developing a new language through which to understand
our emotions and feelings. The kind of sensibility that Shakespeare brought
to the stage, his near-contemporaries Rembrandt and Vermeer worked into a
canvas, while Descartes gave it philosophical flesh. Rembrandt is regarded
as the first, perhaps the greatest, of all self-portraitists because when
we view his paintings we come face to face, for the first time in history,
with a person, a self. It is impossible to look at his self-portraits, especially
of old age, and not see Rembrandt himself. In a similar way, Vermeer's paintings
reveals the new eyes through which painters now viewed their subjects as persons.
Meanwhile, in Descartes' famous phrase cogito ergo sum, we can see
the 'I' being used in a very different way than previously.
In the works of Shakespeare, Rembrandt, Vermeer and Descartes (and of others
of their time) we can see the development of the modern sense of subjectivity,
and of the individual as a rational agent. Human emotions may be furnished
by evolution, but the self that possesses those emotions was forged in the
furnace of history. That's why Shakespeare's work is paradoxically both universal
and contingent. It is universal because, today, whether we live in Britain
or in Japan, we are able to recognise in his characters the workings of our
own self. It is contingent because this concept of the self was not given
by nature but made in history.
We can now see why Pinker shifts so uncomfortably between regarding human
values as distinct from nature and human values as the product of biological
processes. Humans do possess a dual character, as both biological and
historical beings. We are biological beings, and under the purview of biological
and physical laws. But we are also conscious beings with purpose and agency,
and hence able to design ways of breaking the constraints of biological and
physical laws.
The very development of the scientific method has exacerbated this paradox
of being human. To study nature scientifically requires us to make a distinction
between a humanity that is a thinking subject and a nature that presents itself
to thought but is itself incapable of thought. When studying 'external' nature
the distinction between the thinking subject and the object of study is easy
to make. But with the study of human nature, such a neat division becomes
impossible: humans are simultaneously the subject that thinks and the object
of that thought. This is, in philosopher Kate Soper's words, 'the paradox
of humanity's simultaneous immanence and transcendence'. Nature 'is that which
Humanity finds itself within, and to which in some sense its belongs, and
also that from which it seems excluded in the very moment it reflects upon
either its otherness or its belongingness.'
Our very capacity to reflect upon nature, then, takes us in some sense outside
of nature, for if we could not view nature from the outside we could not reflect
upon it objectively. The success of science in understanding nature has, paradoxically,
generated deep problems for the scientific understanding of human nature.
It seems crucial to think of humans as conscious agents capable of rational
thought and collective action if science itself is to advance. But such a
view appears to be an obstacle to the realisation of a fully naturalistic
view of Man. By making humans into conscious agents we seem to separate them
off from the rest of nature, and hence suggest that the language of natural
science cannot fully encompass our humanness.
Pinker, like many contemporary thinkers, attempts to resolve this conundrum
by trying to understand human subjectivity as we might any other natural process.
The self, he suggests, is just a description of a brain process. To say someone
is responsible for their actions is to say that they possess a 'functioning
brain system that can respond to public contingencies of punishment'. Moral
responsibility resides in certain 'parts of the brain (primarily in the prefrontal
cortex)' that are able to inhibit violent or criminal behaviour 'by anticipating
how the community would respond to it'. To invoke the 'self' in any other
sense, Pinker suggests, is to reintroduce the ghost into the machine.
Insofar as this is true, it is saying something trivial. Insofar as it is
saying anything profound, it is untrue. Since brain processes underlie all
thoughts and actions, so the 'self' in some sense must be a brain process.
But to suggest that the self is simply a brain process is a bit like Margaret
Thatcher's infamous argument that 'there is no such thing as society, only
individuals and families'. Individuals and families constitute society. But
society has an existence beyond those individuals and families.
Similarly, with selves. We cannot point to a 'self' in the way that we can
point to a neuron. But that does not mean that neurons have a reality, and
selves don't. As the neurobiologist Joseph le Doux put it in a recent Prospect
essay, 'My assertion that synapses are the basis of personality does not mean
that your personality is determined by synapses; it's the other way round.
Synapses are simply the brain's way receiving, storing and retrieving our
personalities, as determined by all the psychological, cultural and genetic
factors.'
Selves are expressive of the human capacity to act as a subject, rather than
simply exist as an object. The self distills the human capacity transcend
our circumstances, to rise above nature as Katherine Hepburn might have put
it. To talk of humans as 'transcendent' is not to ascribe to them spiritual
properties. It is, rather, to recognise that as subjects we have the ability
to transform our natures and our world, an ability denied to any other physical
being. All animals have an evolutionary past. Only humans make history.
There is, however, a widespread reluctance today to acknowledge this idea
of humans as transformative beings. 'Humans think they are free, conscious
beings', John Gray writes in his provocative new book Straw Dogs, 'but
in truth they are deluded animals'. Straw Dogs is a trenchant critique
of humanism, the belief that humans 'can free themselves from the limits that
frame the lives of other animals' and be 'masters of their own destiny' -
in other words that they exist as subjects rather simply as objects. For Gray,
Professor of Modern European Thought at the LSE, this is an absurd delusion.
'We do not speak of a time when whales or gorillas will be masters of their
destinies', he asks. 'Why then humans?' Only, he suggests, because humanists
deny what Darwin taught us: that humans are animals, and like all animals
we are 'only currents in the drift of genes'.
Like Pinker, Gray begins with the argument that humans can be understood simply
as natural beings. Unlike Pinker, he dispenses with any attempt to reconcile
such a view with humanist notions of freedom and morality. Instead, Gray accepts
the logic of the naturalistic viewpoint: that morality is a 'sickness', freedom
an 'illusion' and the self a 'chimera'.
The whole of the Western rationalist tradition is doomed because it rests
on the faith that 'through science humankind can know truth - and so be free'.
But, Gray argues, 'if Darwin's theory of natural selection is true this is
impossible'. Drawinian processes are driven, not by the need to ascertain
the truth, but to survive and reproduce. Accordingly, 'the human mind serves
evolutionary success, not truth.' Indeed, 'in the struggle for life, a taste
for truth is a luxury', even a 'disability'. Science, Gray suggests, reveals
that 'humans cannot be other than irrational'.
But science itself is a product of our poor, befuddled, irrational, Stone
Age minds. If we cannot trust such minds to discover truths about the world,
how can we accept the verities of science - including the theory of evolution?
The logic of Gray's argument undermines our confidence in its own veracity.
For if we are just another animal, then we cannot place any trust in the claim
that we are just another animal. Far from science revealing humans to be beings
without consciousness and agency, we are only able to do science because of
our ability to transcend our evolutionary heritage, to act as subjects, rather
than as objects.
Gray's entire argument rests on a single proposition. Because humans evolved
like all other species, he suggests, so we continue to be limited like all
other species. This, however, is to commit what is often called the genetic
fallacy - to believe that because the origins of x is A, so x is
A. In other words that because Homo sapiens began as dumb animals, so we must
remain dumb animals. This is a bit like arguing that because new-born infants
are incapable walking, talking or reading Prospect, so adults too are
unable to walk, talk or read Prospect. Gray, like Pinker, seems blind
to the historicity of human nature. Unlike Pinker, he is willing to take such
blindness to its logical conclusion.
Straw Dogs is written not as a conventional book, but as a series of
aphorisms and loosely connected thoughts. It is less a rational argument than
the expression of a mood. But, given the rapture with which the book has been
greeted in some quarters, it is clearly a mood that afflicts many.
A former Thatcherite who has long since become disillusioned with the social
and economic changes that Thatcherism wrought, Gray has increasingly come
to question the very value of the political process. 'Those who struggle to
change the world', he writes, are merely seeking 'consolation for a truth
they are too weak to bear'. Their 'faith that the world can be transformed
by human will is a denial of their own mortality'. We're all going to die
anyway, seems to be the argument, so why bother with grand schemes of social
change? 'The freest human being', Gray suggests, 'is not one who acts on reasons
he has chosen for himself, but one who never has to choose' - a sentiment
that might appear not simply antihumanist but also disturbingly authoritarian.
Steven Pinker would undoubtedly reject Gray's misanthropic antihumanism. Indeed,
he suggests that his aim is to create a new, 'biologically aware humanism'.
Yet the logic of Pinker's argument about human nature takes him in the same
political direction as Gray, even if not to such a nihilistic conclusion.
In the most important chapter of The Blank Slate, Pinker explores the
relationship between evolutionary psychology and contemporary politics. He
rightly dismisses the argument that sociobiology and evolutionary psychology
are inherently reactionary. But, he acknowledges, 'the new sciences of human
nature really do resonate with assumptions that historically were closer to
the right than to the left'.
Drawing on the work of the American economist Thomas Sowell, Pinker suggests
that there are two broad visions of what it is to be human: the Tragic and
the Utopian. The Tragic Vision recognises that humans are 'inherently limited
in knowledge, wisdom and virtue, and all social arrangements must acknowledge
those limits'. Such limitations highlight the importance the importance of
tradition: 'Religion, the family, social customs, sexual mores and political
institutions are a distillation of time-tested techniques that let us work
around the shortcomings of human nature.' It is a vision associated with Thomas
Hobbes, Edmund Burke, Adam Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Isaiah
Berlin and Karl Popper - and now John Gray.
In the Utopian Vision, by contrast, 'psychological limitations are artefacts
that come from our social arrangements, and we should not allow them to restrict
our gaze from what is possible in a better world.' Traditions are regarded
as 'the dead hand of the past, the attempt to rule from the grave', and hence
must be subject to the scrutiny of reason. Only in this fashion have we rid
ourselves of practices such as absolute monarchy, slavery and patriarchy 'that
were once thought to be rooted in human nature'. It's a vision Pinker attributes
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, John Kenneth Galbraith and Ronald
Dworkin.
'The new sciences of human nature', Pinker suggests, 'vindicate some version
of the Tragic Vision and undermine the Utopian outlook'. Science has revealed
the primacy of family ties, the limited scope of communal sharing, and the
universality of violence, dominance and ethnocentrism. It has shown human
nature to be fixed, human beings to be flawed and human politics constrained
by the inadequacies of the human psyche. Since 'our moral sentiments, no matter
how beneficent, overlie a deeper bedrock of selfishness', so Pinker suggests,
'we should not aim to solve social problems like crime or poverty, because
in a world of competing individuals one person's gain may be another person's
loss. The best we can do is to trade off one cost against another.' Or, as
John Gray puts it, 'The good life is not found in dreams of progress, but
in coping with tragic contingencies.'
Evolutionary psychology has certainly thrown light on many aspects of human
behaviour. But it has not revealed humans to be innately ethnocentric or selfish,
nor that crime and poverty are ineradicable aspects of the human condition.
It is not the science of human nature that has undermined utopian visions.
Rather the political demise of utopianism, has given credibility to certain
interpretations of evolutionary psychology.
The barbarous history of the twentieth century - two World Wars and the Holocaust,
gulags and ethnic cleansing, global warming and species depletion - has left
many people disillusioned about what it means to be human. Every impression
that Man makes upon the world, many have come to believe, is always for the
worse. 'For the first time since 1750', Michael Ignatieff wrote in Prospect,
'people experience history not running forwards, from savagery to civilisation,
but backwards to barbarism'.
The result, as Straw Dogs so strikingly reveals, has been a growth
of anti-humanism, of despair about human capacities, a view of human reason
as a force for destruction rather than for betterment. These views have been
strengthened by changes of past two decades - the collapse of Marxism, disillusionment
with ideas of social transformation, the seeming irrelevance of politics to
our lives. In this process utopianism has become a dirty word, standing for
the hubristic belief that human reason can solve human problems, a belief
that, many feel, can only lead to totalitarianism.
The consequence of all this has been the increased acceptance that we should
limit our political horizons, that we should look to manage rather than to
overcome problems, and that we should look to science to explain why we cannot
do certain things rather than to politics to see how we can. Against this
background many have read evolutionary accounts of human nature as explanations
of human limits, as scientific validation of the impossibility of social solutions
to our most deep-seated problems.
'To try and do something which is inherently impossible', the conservative
philosopher Michael Oakshott argues, 'is always a corrupting enterprise.'
Oakshott, Pinker suggests, sums up the dangers of transgressing the limits
revealed by evolutionary psychology. But without such transgression is any
form of historical progress possible? And what could be more corrupting than
accepting as inevitable problems that we might be able to tackle were we to
attempt the impossible? As Pinker himself puts it, for Utopians, 'the existence
of suffering and injustice presents us with an undeniable moral imperative.
We don't know what we can achieve until we try, and the alternative of resigning
ourselves to these evils as the way of the world, is unconscionable.'