Much of the problem in a debate such as this is a confusion between two different
meanings of multiculturalism - multiculturalism as ideology and multiculturalism
as lived experience.
When most people say that multiculturalism is a good thing what they mean
is the experience of living in a society that is less insular, less homogenous,
more vibrant and cosmopolitan than before.
Those who advocate multiculturalism as an ideology are, however, talking about
something different. Multiculturalism, they argue, requires the public recognition
and affirmation of cultural differences. We live in a world, so the argument
runs, in which there are deep-seated conflicts between cultures embodying
different values. Different peoples and cultures have different values, beliefs
and truths, many of which are incommensurate but all of which are valid in
their own context. Social justice requires not just that individuals are treated
as political equals, but that their cultural beliefs are also treated as equally
valid, and indeed are institutionalised in the public sphere. As the American
scholar Iris Young puts it 'groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific
experience, culture and social contributions are publicly affirmed and recognised.'
I want to suggest that such multiculturalism as ideology is not only politically
reactionary, but also undermines much of what is valuable about multiculturalism
as lived experience.
At the heart of the problem of multiculturalism is its confusion of political
equality with cultural identity. Equality of cultural identity is not the
same as political equality. Indeed, it undermines the possibility of any such
equality. First, because political equality requires a distinction between
the public and private spheres. The private sphere is inherently unequal.
Political equality only becomes possible with the creation of a ring-fenced
public sphere, which everyone can enter as political equals, whatever their
cultural, economic or ethnic backgrounds. The creation of such a sphere is
one of the great advances of modernity. The demand for the public recognition
for individual or cultural differences is, on the other hand, a demand to
erase the distinction between the public and the private spheres, and hence
to undermine the possibility of real equality.
Second, political equality requires, not a plurality of meanings, but a common
measure of judgement. The very demand that we accord equal recognition to
cultures is an appeal to a universalistic principle of social justice. But
the possibility of establishing any such principle is, ironically, undermined
by the embrace of a pluralistic outlook.
To treat different cultures with equal respect (indeed to treat them with
any kind of respect at all) we have to be able to compare one with the other.
The principle of difference cannot provide any standards that oblige us to
respect the 'difference' of others. At best, it invites our indifference to
the fate of the Other. At worst it licenses us to hate and abuse those who
are different. Why, after all, should we not abuse and hate them? On what
basis can they demand our respect or we demand theirs?
What this suggests is that we can either recognise people as equal, or we
can recognise cultures as equal. We can't do both.
Equality arises from fact that humans are political creatures and possess
a capacity for culture. But the fact that all humans possess a capacity for
culture does not mean that all cultures are equal. Some societies, some political
systems, some cultural forms, are better than others: more just, more free,
more enlightened, and simply more conducive to human progress.
Clearly no human can live outside of culture. But that is not to say they
have to live inside a particular one. Many multiculturalists, however, often
confuse the idea of humans as culture-bearing creatures with that of humans
as having to bear a particular one
.
To view humans as culture-bearing is to view them as social beings, and hence
as transformative beings. It suggests that humans have the capacity for change,
for progress, and for the creation of universal moral and political forms
through reason and dialogue.
To view humans as having to bear specific cultures is, on the contrary, to
deny such a capacity for transformation. It suggests that every human being
is so shaped by a particular culture that to challenge or undermine that culture
would be to undermine the very dignity of that individual. It suggests that
the biological fact of, say, Bangladeshi ancestry somehow make a human being
incapable of living well except as a participant of Bangladeshi culture. The
idea of culture once connoted all that freed humans from the blind weight
of tradition, has now, in the hands of multiculturalists, become identified
with that very burden.
In large part, this denial of the transformative character of human existence
is the product of political disillusionment and defeat. The end of the Cold
War, the collapse of the left, the defeat of most liberation movements in
the third world and the demise of social movements in the West, have all transformed
political consciousness. In this process, the quest for equality has increasingly
been abandoned in favour of the claim to a diverse society. Campaigning for
equality means challenging accepted practices, being willing to march against
the grain, to believe in the possibility of social transformation. Conversely,
celebrating differences between peoples allows us to accept society as it
is - it says little more than 'We live in a diverse world, enjoy it'. As the
American writer Nancy Fraser has put it, 'The remedy required to redress injustice
will be cultural recognition, as opposed to political-economic redistribution.'
And therein lies the fundamental problem - multiculturalism inevitably fades
into a plea to be included in, rather than a demand for social transformation.
The real question we need to ask ourselves is why we should value diversity.
There is nothing good in itself about diversity. It is important because it
allows us to compare and contrast different values, beliefs and lifestyles,
make judgements upon them, and decide which are better and which worse. It's
important, in other words, because it allows us to engage in political dialogue
and debate that can, paradoxically, help create more universal values and
beliefs.
But it is precisely such dialogue and debate, and the making of such judgements,
that multiculturalism attempts to suppress in the name of 'tolerance' and
'respect'. I've lost count, for instance, of the number of occasions over
the past decade I've been refused permission by both newspaper and radio editors
to quote from Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses because it was considered
to cause too much 'offence'. The very thing that is valuable about diversity
- the clashes and conflicts that it brings about - is what contemporary multiculturalists
most fear.
Multiculturalists often suggest to me that they deal with the messy realties
of the world, while I, as an Enlightenment universalist, think of the word
in clearcut black and white terms. In fact, the opposite is the case. Multiculturalists
are frightened of the messiness of the world, want everything nicely parcelled
up, free of conflict, all neat and ordered. And such order can only come at
the cost of our liberties.
Consider, for instance, Tariq Modood's demand for what he calls an 'equality
encompassing public ethnicity: equality as not having to hide or apologise
for one's origins, family or community, but requiring others to show respect
for them, and adapt public attitudes and arrangements so that the heritage
they represent is encouraged rather than contemptuously expect them to wither
away.'
But why should I, as an atheist, be expected to show respect for Christian,
Islamic or Jewish cultures whose views and arguments I often find reactionary
and despicable? Why should public arrangements be adapted to fit in with the
backward, misogynistic, homophobic claims that religions often make? What
is wrong with me wishing such cultural forms to 'wither away'? And how, given
that I do view these and many other cultures with contempt, am I supposed
to provide them with respect, without disrespecting my own views? Only, as
the philosopher Brian Barry suggests 'with a great deal of encouragement from
the Thought Police'.
A truly plural society would be one in which citizens have full freedom to
pursue their different values or practices in private, while in the public
sphere all citizens would be treated as political equals whatever the differences
in their private lives. Today, however, pluralism has come to mean the very
opposite. The right to practice a particular religion, speak a particular
language, follow a particular cultural practice is seen as a public good rather
than a private freedom. While our rights to do, write or even think as private
citizens are increasingly curtailed in the name of 'tolerance'.
Can multiculturalism work? As an increasingly authoritarian form of social
regulation, yes. But as part of a process through which to create a freer,
more equal, more just society, in which we can critically engage with diversity
as lived experience? No.