Why are most people in the world religious? And how can we shake them out
of their delusion? Those are the two questions at the heart of Daniel Dennett's
book. The questions are closely linked. As an atheist, Dennett wants to rid
the world of religion. By subjecting religion to the scrutiny of science he
hopes to work out how.
For Dennett, one of the world's foremost philosophers and a great proselytiser
for science, religion must be seen as a natural phenomenon. By 'natural' Dennett
means two things. First, that it is not supernatural, and so not beyond the
scrutiny of science and reason. But natural to Dennett also means something
else - that religion can, and should, be understood in evolutionary terms.
The origin of religion, Dennett suggests, lies in the evolved human tendency
to attribute beliefs, desires and intentions to 'anything complicated that
moves'. This is an argument that has been developed in recent years by two
evolutionary anthropologists, Scott Atran and Pascal Bowyer, upon whose work
Dennett draws heavily. As social animals, humans are evolved to be acutely
sensitive to the intentions of others, so much so that we are prone to attribute
minds to inanimate objects and to assume that intentions lie behind many unintentioned
events. Early humans conjured up the idea of spirits and gods to account for
events that might otherwise seem uncaused, such as rainfall or the changing
of the seasons. These ancestral religions developed into more sophisticated
and elaborated descendents over time, 'as people became more and more reflective
about both their practices and their reactions'. Religious ideas, Dennett
argues, are not beneficial to humans but are parasitical on our evolved human
nature.
Much of the controversy about the book has centred on Dennett's atheism and
his attempt to deconstruct religion with the tools of science. In fact his
frank disbelief is refreshing, even if his condescension towards believers
('I wonder if any believers in the End Times will have the intellectual honesty
and courage to read this book through') can often be trying. And his project
of putting religion under rational scrutiny is surely to be welcomed in an
age in which faith seems to shape so much of people's responses to political
and social issues. The real problem is that Dennett's explanation of religion
is less than convincing. It may be true that humans possess certain psychological
dispositions that open them to religious ideas. But uncovering such traits
is not the same as explaining the origins, let alone the contemporary attractions,
of religion.
What people seek in religion is often not obvious, and is often shaped by
historical and social context. In the pre-scientific world, for instance,
belief in supernatural deities often provided a rational means of understanding
the unpredictability of the world. Indeed the concept of God as creating a
lawful universe played an important role in the development of science, one
of the reasons that many of the pioneers of the Scientific Revolution were
deeply devout men.
But in a world in which science has shown itself to be spectacularly successful
in understanding nature, religion necessarily means something very different.
What drives Christian fundamentalists to embrace Creationism today is not
the same as what drove many nineteenth century Christians to decry Darwin.
People often embrace religion today for reasons that, paradoxically, have
little to do with God. Why, for instance, has radical Islam increasingly found
a hold in Muslim communities over the past 20 years? For reasons that have
little to do with either religion or evolution. A sense of perceived victimhood,
the failure of secular political movements, a desire to salvage a sense of
identity, a yearning to rediscover strong values – these are the kinds
of issues that have moulded the new Islamic radicalism. It has been said that
to understand Islamic terrorism we would be better off reading Joseph Conrad’s
The Secret Agent than the Koran.
What is missing from Breaking the Spell is any sense of religion
as a social or historical, as opposed to a purely natural, phenomenon. Dennett
dismisses as unscientific the long and rich history of scholarship into the
social roots of religion. The result is a seriously distorted analysis and
a curiously arid book. There is no sense here of any engagement with religion
as it is actually lived or experienced, rather than as Dennett would like
to imagine it in theory. 'Do some research!' Dennett exhorts believers. It's
good advice for philosophers too.