The key flashpoints of the Cold War are fairly obvious: Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam,
Korea. But Reykjavik? In 1972 it played host to the most surreal of all Cold
War confrontations: the battle between Bobby Fischer and Boris Spassky to
be world chess champion.
For the Soviet Union, chess had always been a key weapon in the Cold War.
Even more than sport, the cerebral character of chess gave it significance
in asserting Soviet superiority over the West. Chess, Daniel Johnson writes,
'fitted perfectly the official image of Soviet Man as serious minded, logical
and "scientific" even in his leisure activity'. And in Spassky,
it possessed 'the most cultivated, the most charming, the most good looking
and the most popular' of all Soviet world champions.
America, on the other hand, had virtually ignored the game, largely because
no American had been good enough to challenge Soviet supremacy. Until, that
is, Bobby Fischer burst on to the scene. The son of a Communist Party member
(and possible spy), Fischer himself was virulently anti-communist, not to
mention poisonously anti-Semitic and teetering on the edge of pathological
paranoia. He was also a chess genius, described by one Russian grandmaster
as 'An Achilles without an Achilles' heel'.
For Fischer the showdown at Reykjavik committed 'the free world against the
lying, cheating, hypocritical Russians'. Richard Nixon agreed, sending Fisher
his 'personal congratulations' and assuring him that 'I will be rooting for
you'. Henry Kissinger also put in a call. 'America wants you to go over there
to beat the Russians', he told Fischer.
Fischer did beat the Russians - though as much by gamesmanship as by genius.
He failed to show up for more than week and then deliberately turned up late
for the rescheduled opening match. He insisted that the chairs, the chessboard,
and the lighting were all changed, that the TV cameras be banished, and that
a game be played in a back room away from the spectators. At one point he
started shouting in the middle of a match and had to be restrained. Fischer's
antics, observed Garry Kasparov, who would, a decade later, be the greatest
of all chess champions, 'broke Spassky'.
The Reykjavik match forms the centrepiece of Johnson's meticulously researched
study. The bizarreness and theatricality of the confrontation was, he suggests,
the perfect metaphor for the Cold War. 'The Cold War was the first war caused
and dominated by intellectuals and it was best symbolised by the game of the
intellectuals'. Fischer-Spassky 'was the Cold War's supreme work of art',
embodying 'abstract purism, incipient paranoia, sublimated homicide'.
White King and Red Queen is less a history of chess than a history
of the Soviet Union narrated through the fate of its chess players. Johnson
spells out the often brutal methods used to turn chess into a political tool
and to create the extraordinary state infrastructure that underpinned the
Soviet domination of the game. He also demonstrates the remarkable passion
for chess, among both intellectuals and the public. Many of the greatest Soviet
writers and musicians, from Nabokov to Shostakovich, were obsessive players.
Chess, Johnson suggests, 'was one of the very few officially sanctioned areas
of intellectual freedom. Unlike art, music or literature, chess was a creative
pursuit that did not have to be conducted according to rules and theories
laid down by the authorities, from which any deviation was punishable by a
term in a labour camp or worse.' As a result, 'Soviet chess was both a microcosm
of life in a collectivist society and - as a last refuge of the free spirit
- its antithesis.'
For Johnson, the story of chess and the Cold War is not just a history but
also a morality tale, a fable of good vs evil, of liberty vanquishing totalitarianism.
'No other field of mental strife', Johnson writes, 'exhibits so vividly the
true significance of the [Soviet] endeavour to abolish human freedom once
and for all'. It is an approach which provides Johnson with what he calls
'moral clarity' - a phrase tellingly borrowed from the Soviet dissident Natan
Sharansky, who on hearing Ronald Reagan's description of the Soviet Union
as the 'evil empire' suggested that 'immediately, there was moral clarity'.
The trouble, though, is that history is not as black and white as the pieces
on a chess board. There is, in Johnson's narrative, a lack of both shading
and perspective that after a while gets wearing. His attempts to paint every
action by every Soviet leader as ineffably evil is both comical and tiresome.
Stalin, he writes, 'does not seem to have been a chess player; as a young
man he preferred terrorism'. As for Lenin, 'after his return from exile to
Russia in 1917 [he] gave up chess altogether. He was able to use real people
as pawns instead'. Whatever the crimes of Stalin and Lenin, such visceral
invective does little to illuminate the nature either of the Soviet Union
or of chess.
At the same time, in his headlong rush to convict Moscow, Johnson ignores
the extent to which the West itself played the ideological game, manipulating
everything from the space race to sports tournaments for political ends. And
he overstretches the metaphoric power of chess to the point of parody. Chess,
for Johnson, 'illustrates the process by which Western civilisation ultimately
triumphed over the gravest threat it had ever encountered'.
To reject Johnson's black-and-white theory of history is not to embrace the
moral relativism against which he warns. Rather, it is to make a distinction
between moral values, sporting battles and historical struggles and to suggest
that it is possible to take a stand in favour of liberty, democracy and an
open society without necessarily seeing the world as if it were a battle between
Aslan and the White Witch - and without accepting Ronald Reagan, Margaret
Thatcher and Pope John Paul II as the three great revolutionaries for freedom.
Chess, as Johnson himself points out, 'makes a good allegory, but a bad teacher'.